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BETWEEN ASEAN DEMOS AND ASEAN KRATOS: THE GENESIS 
OF ASEAN PUBLIC SPHERES
This study centers on the following question: do the political, civil 
society organizations, and media infrastructure conditions exist for 
the emergence of ASEAN public spheres? The following definition 
of ASEAN public sphere have been constructed: a transnational 
site of deliberation in which civil society organizations reach an 
understanding about issues of common concern in ASEAN according 
to the norms of publicity. Patterns from three distinct structures that 
converged to form ASEAN public spheres has been identified. Firstly, 
the prime site of ASEAN’s governance consisting of the ASEAN 
Summit, ASEAN Community Councils, and ASEAN Secretariat has, 
to a certain extent, become open to the people’s input. Secondly, the 
emergence of transnational civil society and discursive publics in 
ASEAN. As a reservoir for the grassroot opinion- and will-formation, 
the civil society in ASEAN has been indispensable in terms of its 
norms of publicity and political efficacy. Thirdly, the cross borders 
communicative infrastructure has proven to be significant in terms 
of the grassroot formation fora as well as the mobilization of free 
and critical public opinion towards ASEAN across the region. They 
also challenge the “manipulative” and “manufactured consent” that 
tends to be propagated by the mainstream pro-political authority and 
pro-market media. Despite the prevailing supremacy of ASEAN’s 
political elites, as well as the interstate ICT cleavages in the region, I 
argue that a conducive milieu has developed in which ASEAN public 
spheres can indeed emerge.
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Introduction
Approximately 40 years since its inception, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) had finally ratified its very first ASEAN Charter in 2007. 
It is intended to serve as a “legal and institutional framework” for ASEAN. 
This historical progress lays a foundational shift from an intergovernmental 
paradigm towards a more “people-centered” ASEAN. In parallel with the 
critical science embodied within Jurgen Habermas’ works, this research shall 
engage the contemporary development in ASEAN from his perspective of the 
“public sphere” theory. As consistently emphasized by Habermas, the public 
sphere is a pivotal precept for the democratization process (Habermas 1991, 
1996, 1998, 2001, 2012). 
Despite the grandiose receptions received by the public sphere theory 
(e.g., Calhoun et al 1992), the advent of the twenty-first century globalization has 
increasingly subjected the three conventional structures that inform the theory 
to some massive challenges: national media, nation state’s political authority, 
and national citizenship. Accordingly, this investigation employed Angela 
Crack’s modified conceptions of Habermas’ original public sphere theory – a 
“transnational public spheres” theory. Crack defines the transnational public 
sphere as a “site of deliberation in which non-state actors reach understandings 
about issues of common concern”. 
By reconstructing Habermas’ and Crack’s conceptions of public 
sphere, I propose the following definition of “ASEAN public sphere”: a 
transnational site of deliberation in which civil society organizations reach an 
understanding about issues of common concern in ASEAN according to the 
norms of publicity. Thus, a primary research question that guides this endeavor 
is “do the political, civil society organizations, and media infrastructure 
conditions exist for the emergence of the ASEAN public spheres?”
The main research question has been divided into three sub-research 
questions: (1) Do the political conditions exist for the emergence of ASEAN 
public spheres?; (2) Do the civil society organization conditions exist for 
the emergence of ASEAN public spheres?; (3) Do the media infrastructure 
conditions exist for the emergence of ASEAN public spheres?
The research objectives are as follows. Firstly, the study analyzes the 
political conditions for the emergence of ASEAN public spheres. Secondly, 
it investigates the civil society organization conditions for the emergence 
of ASEAN public spheres. Thirdly, it evaluates the media infrastructure 
conditions for the emergence of ASEAN public spheres.
ASEAN Background 
ASEAN was established amidst the Cold War in 1967. After the failures of 
two previous attempts to forge Southeast Asian regional inter-state cooperation 
Article: Abdul Muein Abadi
 
Jebat  Volume 42 (2) (December 2015) Page | 2
– Maphilindo and Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) – ASEAN has 
surprisingly survived until today. With a pursuit for regional peace and stability 
remained as ASEAN’s cornerstone, the organization has evolved into a much 
over-arching entity in parallel with the enlargement process. Along with the 
expansion of ASEAN, this regional platform has also become an irresistible 
fulcrum due to the rise of various pressing transnational concerns. Indeed, 
globalization obviously did not play little role in ASEAN’s unprecedented 
regionalism progress. The end of the Cold War for instance, did not only 
affect the increased number of ASEAN members via the accession of Socialist 
and authoritarian regimes alone. The increased connectivity among ASEAN 
member states has also proved to be one of the most significant implications 
due to the advent of globalization. Eventually, during the 9th ASEAN Summit 
in 2003, ASEAN leaders had unanimously adopted a highly ambitious dream 
– to move together towards the establishment of a single ASEAN Community 
in 2015. 
However, the degree of citizens’ engagement in the aforementioned 
ASEAN Community project is quite questionable. This trend has been echoed 
by one of ASEAN studies scholar: 
“regionalism in Southeast Asia is commonly understood as those 
processes of inter-state interactions, dialogue and cooperation that 
take place under the purview of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)….however, with the ASEAN cooperation on 
regional governance controlled and driven by the region’s political 
and bureaucratic elite with little room for civil society inputs or 
participation in regional governance processes” (Nesadurai 2012, 
p.1). 
Indeed, under the period of rapid market economy-oriented regionalization 
progress in the Southeast Asia around the 1980s, the relationships between 
ASEAN with corporate entities had become more solidified than ever4. 
With the ASEAN’s further aim toward the establishment of a single regional 
economic market, the neoliberal market paradigm has attained its ultimate 
position in the region’s agenda. To make it worse, the rise of the neoliberal 
turn in ASEAN’s regionalization occurred at the expense of the public opinion 
(Moorthy & Benny 2012; 2013; Igarashi 2011, p.9). 
As a result, it is debatable whether the peoples of ASEAN – or called 
the “ASEAN’s demos” – are possessing any hopeful potential at all pertaining 
to their opinion to efficaciously influence the governance affairs at the ASEAN 
level. Hence, this inquiry sets to contribute into the theoretical debates that 
revolved around the interconnections of three particular structures: ASEAN 
political authority, its citizens or demos, as well as the communication media 
that dwell across Southeast Asia. This quest is deemed relevant since the 
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interrelationship between those structures possesses an intrinsic significance 
for the democratization in the ASEAN governance which has yet to be 
uncovered. 
ASEAN Public Spheres Structures 
This inquiry focused on the three outlined structures in the search for the 
prospects of the emergence of the ASEAN public spheres. Built upon 
Habermas’ and Crack’s conceptualization, I propose the following definition 
of ASEAN public sphere: “a transnational site of deliberation in which civil 
society organizations reach an understanding about issues of common concern 
in ASEAN according to the norms of publicity”. The ASEAN public spheres 
structures that shall be scrutinized respectively are: ASEAN political authority; 
the transnational civil society organizations involved in the formation of 
publics opinion on ASEAN affairs; and the media infrastructure that resides 
across the region. Now I turn to explain the details of each ASEAN public 
spheres structure. 
First of all, ASEAN’s political structure shall be examined based 
on its increasingly “bureaucratic-like” institutions: the ASEAN Summit, 
ASEAN Community Councils, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat – under the 
aegis of the ASEAN Charter. In the same way as Habermas had centered the 
rise of the bourgeois constitutional states in the eighteenth century Europe 
via the Britain’s reform bill of 1834, as well as the French Revolution in 
France and July Revolution in Germany, this inquiry shall also delve into the 
“constitutionalization” of ASEAN. Hence, ASEAN’s progress – from the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration towards the 2007 unanimously ratified ASEAN Charter 
– shall be appraised under the light of the three mentioned political institutions 
in ASEAN. These political authorities are subsequently recognized as ASEAN 
“triple power helix”. Among these “triple power helix” institutions, the ASEAN 
Summit in particular was considered as the most powerful entity in Southeast 
Asia by virtues of acquiring immense share in shaping the journey toward the 
realization of the ASEAN Community project. It is, after all, consisted of the 
ten relatively most powerful persons in Southeast Asia, namely the countries’ 
leaders. Thus, the degree of accountability and the receptions among these 
three ASEAN‟s political institutions helix towards the ASEAN demos’ public 
opinion will be studied accordingly. 
Secondly, the transnational civil society organizations’ structures that 
dwell in Southeast Asia will be analyzed to determine to what extent their 
represented cross-border deliberations are adhered to deliberative norms. 
Those deliberative norms which have been elaborated by Crack (2008) are as 
follows: 
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“First, that debate should be free and open to all affected actors as 
nominal equals, regardless of their social status. Second, debate 
should be conducted according to certain principles. For example, 
participants should endeavor to make their contributions intelligible 
to others; and when interrogated, be willing to provide reasoned 
justification for their opinions. Third, arguments should be oriented 
toward understanding and adjudicating through rational judgment” 
(Crack 2008, p.19). 
 ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-
ISIS) and the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) shall be treated 
as two primary network institutions consisting of the transnational civil society 
in the Southeast Asia. The ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) and ASEAN 
Peoples Forum (APF) on the other hand are the two “deliberative forums” that 
have been set up and organized by the two aforementioned networks: the APA 
was organized by ASEAN-ISIS; the APF was arranged by the SAPA. In the 
same way the eighteenth century coffee houses, salons, and Tischgesellschaften 
hosting the rational-critical discussions among the bourgeois publics, the 
APA and APF are also considered as the two prime candidates to inherit this 
task particularly at the ASEAN level. The only difference between these 
transnational deliberative forum with their European predecessors are in terms 
of the driving force behind them. While the bourgeois public sphere was 
sparked by the bourgeois economic owners‟ concerns against the absolutism 
of the political authority, the participants in those ASEAN public spheres solely 
concern with their mission to empower the political efficacy of ASEAN‟s 
demos themselves. 
Last but not least, the communicative structures in the Southeast Asia 
will be scrutinized for the sake of revealing to what extent they are accorded 
the critical, open, free, and inclusive arrangement dealing with ASEAN issues. 
ASEAN’s, national, and civil society’s media shall be explored and the scope 
examined shall be narrowed to their reporting on ASEAN affairs only. It will 
be tackled from the perspective of their degree of the critical publicity and 
interconnections with the previously scrutinized transnational civil society in 
the Southeast Asia as well as the “triple power helix” of the ASEAN‟s political 
authority. Hence, in almost the same fashion as the European critical journals 
and political newspapers attached themselves to the critical discussions in the 
coffee houses, salons, and Tischgesellschaften, this inquiry set to examine the 
very same attachments between the SAPA‟s-organized APF with the media 
infrastructure across the Southeast Asia region. Due to the fact that this region 
boasts of diverse languages and dialects, this investigation shall only be limited 
to involve the English sources. The degree of critical rational appearance 
between the ASEAN’s, national’s, and civil society’s media shall also be further 
assessed. Apart from the ASEAN’s civil society organizations-formulated 
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opinion contents, this particular section shall also pay some attention to the 
infrastructure capacity – the accessibility and ownership of media resources. 
By reconfiguring the rise of a cross-border communicative capacity as well 
as the broadening of the Southeast Asian demos, this section is set to provide 
some grassroots power-balancing vis-à-vis the current transnational political 
authority that has yet to be unleashed thus far. Table 1 below summarizes 
the envisioned operationalization of the three structural preconditions for the 
emergence of ASEAN public spheres. 
TABLE 1.  Three ASEAN Public Spheres Structural Focuses
ASEAN political 
structure
Transnational civil society 
structure in Southeast Asia
Communicative structure 
in Southeast Asia
ASEAN Summit ASEAN-ISIS and ASEAN 
People‟s Assembly (APA)
ASEAN’s Media
ASEAN Community 
Councils
Solidarity for Asian People’s 
Advocacy (SAPA)
National Media
ASEAN Secretariat ASEAN People’s Forum 
(APF)
Civil Society’s Media
Methodology
This inquiry can be categorized particularly under the “qualitative approach” 
box. Apart from the considerably salient philosophical stance that I have 
already elaborated in the previous chapter, the “strategies of inquiry” as well 
as the nature of “research practices” possessed by the qualitative approach 
are also unequivocally leaning towards this research interest. In terms of 
the strategy of inquiry, case study is considered as the best way to scrutinize 
ASEAN structures from the reconfigured transnational public sphere theory. In 
general, case studies is “a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher explores 
a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals in more in depth 
way. Cases are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed 
information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained 
period of time” (Stake, 1995, cited from Creswell 2009, p.11). To that end, 
three parallel data-gathering processes had been conducted.
The concrete data collection method for this inquiry is distinguished 
based on each of the involved transnational public sphere structures developed 
in the previous three theoretical sections. Firstly, all relevant published 
documents– ASEAN Charter document, ASEAN Community Blueprints, 
as well as ASEAN-ISIS official documents – had been engaged. All of the 
documents had been collected directly from ASEAN official website. The 
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step is considered significant due to the fact that in order to answer the first 
research question, the essence of ASEAN political structures’ evolution 
since its inceptions can only be grasped through ASEAN official documents. 
Furthermore, through the details as well as the context that the documents 
provides, the exact ASEAN progress toward more responsive and more people-
centered orientation can be gauged. This is in line with Habermas’ original 
conception of public sphere – the existence of responsive political authority.
Secondly, the “Joint Statement of the ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference/ASEAN Peoples‟ Forum (ACSC/APF)” had also been scrutinized. 
Two official websites provide ample opportunity with regard to the first-hand 
source, namely the ASEAN Official Website as well as each of SAPA’s major 
networking websites, reference has been made to their collective advocacy in the 
ASEAN Community building. SAPA reports, as well as the existing academic 
literatures on the APA, APF, and ASEAN had also been critically reviewed. 
This particular data-gathering step is deemed critical since in order to answer 
the second research question, a comprehensive information on civil society 
organizations (CSOs) that engage at ASEAN level need to be comprehend. 
Thus, through the official websites of each of the CSOs, the data had been 
accessed and downloaded – who they are, what are their objectives, what are 
their activities, and finally they had been evaluated from the perspective of 
how inclusive they are in terms of membership and mobilization, as well as 
how critical they are toward ASEAN. If the first data-gathering step concerned 
“ASEAN Kratos”, this second step is concerned with “ASEAN Demos”.
The third and final data-gathering step is related to the linchpin 
that connects ASEAN Demos to ASEAN Kratos: the media. There are two 
different types of media involved: the new media and the traditional media. 
Through the new media, channels such as the ASEAN’s Facebook page, along 
with SAPA Facebook page had been browsed, respectively along with other 
alternative media¹. In terms of the traditional media, the English newspapers in 
ten ASEAN countries had been explored. The papers explored are The Nation 
(Thailand), The Phnom Penh Post (Cambodia), Viet Nam News (Vietnam), 
the Straits Times (Singapore), The Star (Malaysia), Brunei Times (Brunei), 
Vientiane Times (Laos), The Myanmar Times (Myanmar), The Philippines 
Daily Inquirer (Philippines), and The Jakarta Post (Indonesia). Nevertheless, 
each of the selected media were only analyzed through their online contents. 
This selection had to be done since in order to be categorized as “ASEAN-
level media”, they must be accessible across all ten ASEAN member countries. 
This step is crucial since its provide a comprehensive view of to what extent 
does the voice of ASEAN Demos has been transmitted among ASEAN 
Demos themselves, as well as to what extent their voice had been listened by 
ASEAN Kratos. This had been analyze through the usage of “ASEAN-related” 
keywords in each of the media. While the traditional media were expected to 
be more of “top-down” oriented, the new media – particularly those owned 
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by CSOs – were expected to be more “bottom-up” in terms of their contents. 
Table 2 below summarizes the data collection methods for each of the ASEAN 
public sphere structures. 
TABLE 2.  Data Collection Method for the Inquiry of this Study
ASEAN Public Sphere Structures Data Sources
ASEAN Political Structures ASEAN officials speeches, Official websites, 
Official documents, Literature
Transnational Civil Society Structures in 
Southeast Asia
Published documents, transnational civil 
society websites, Literature
Media Structures in Southeast Asia English newspapers websites, portals, 
Literature
Finding 1: ASEAN Political Authority 
Incepted as a loose cooperative intergovernmental pact between the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia amidst the Cold War, ASEAN 
was prompted to evolve gradually – not only in terms of its membership, but 
also from the perspective of its guiding principles and rules. The ASEAN 
Secretariat was established with a Secretary-General post headquartered in 
Jakarta in 1976. ASEAN’s later transition towards the ASEAN Community 
project has further discarded its early Realist-adherence nature. The rise of 
globalization, in particular the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that infringed 
the region, nevertheless had transcended the pace of the Southeast Asian 
transnational governance-political architecture evolutions. The surge of non-
traditional security concerns across the region leaves the leaders of the ten 
ASEAN countries to one common path: to partially submit their absolute 
nation states authority to a more supranational order of ASEAN. Therefore, 
through the primary data gathered from the ASEAN official websites, the 
current state of ASEAN’s political authority that consisted of the ASEAN 
Summit, ASEAN Community Councils, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat – 
that is subjected to the ASEAN Charter – has been gradually opened in terms 
of their accountability and receptive level to the public opinion. 
As compared to the ASEAN’s original purposes enshrined in the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration, the 2007 ASEAN Charter has expanded its purposes. 
In terms of ASEAN‟s shift towards “democracy” and “people-oriented” 
aspirations, the fourth, seventh, and thirteenth “Purposes” of ASEAN are of 
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relevance here.  
“To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in 
peace with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious 
environment” (ASEAN‟s fourth purpose, ASEAN Charter, p.4)  
“To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule 
of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the 
Member States of ASEAN” (ASEAN‟s seventh purpose, ASEAN 
Charter, p.4)  
“To promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society 
are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of 
ASEAN integration and community building” (ASEAN‟s thirteenth 
purpose, ASEAN Charter, p.5)     
More surprisingly, those democratic aspirations were relatively 
manifested in the Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter – in which the proposal for 
the establishment of “ASEAN Human Rights Body” was officially rendered for 
the first time.  It states that “[I]n conformity with the purposes and principles of 
the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights 
body” (ASEAN Charter, p.19). Furthermore, one of the three key ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (APSC) characteristics, namely a “rules-based 
community of shared values and norms” has even outlined a list of critical 
concrete sub-actions that are related to the democratic norms.  Pages 3 and 4 of 
the APSC Blueprint particularly point out the following guidelines: 
“Intensify exchange of experience and training courses in order to 
enhance popular and broader participation”  
“Hold seminars/workshops to share experiences on democratic 
institutions, gender mainstreaming, and popular participation”  
“Encourage the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information 
(AMRI) to develop an institutional framework to facilitate free flow 
of information, based on each country‟s national laws, by establishing 
an information baseline of these laws and to submit a progress report 
to the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council”  
“Request each ASEAN Member State to develop relevant media 
exchange programmes to aid free flow of information, starting within 
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three months from the adoption of this Blueprint”  
“Enhance media capacity to promote regional-community building, 
explore the possibility of establishing an ASEAN media panel 
to boost cooperation and collaboration among the mediarelated 
institutions and organizations with emphasis on the process of the 
implementation of the APSC Blueprint”  
“Implement internships, fellowships, scholarships and workshops, 
study visits and journalist exchange programs to enhance media 
capacity and professionalism in the region with emphasis on the 
process of the implementation of the APSC Blueprint”  
“Facilitate co-production and exchanges of films, TVs, animations, 
games and new media content to promote cultural exchanges 
with emphasis on the process of the implementation of the APSC 
Blueprint” (APSC Blueprint, p.3-4).  
 With such assertion on “free flow of information”, “media exchange 
programs”, as well as the “media capacity” that were explicitly displayed in 
the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, it can be said that a solid 
foundation for the emergence of ASEAN public spheres has been laid in the 
ASEAN‟s political authority structure.
 ASEAN‟s survival, let alone its gradual progress towards a single 
Community dream, has been very astonishing. Nevertheless, with such 
a highly elitist “ASEAN Way” of a decision-making process that has been 
revealed, how can a democratic adherence to the public opinion stand a chance 
in the course of the ASEAN Community building? It should be noted here that 
the problem is not at all about the absence of specific “political authorities” 
within ASEAN that are capable to carry out any decisive take concerning the 
region. Instead, it is the “sluices” where the ASEAN‟s demos‟ public opinion 
can compel those authorities that are crucial for the emergence of the ASEAN 
public spheres. Also, the advent of the late twentieth century globalization 
influx has obviously increased the feasibility of those kinds of channels or 
sluices in ASEAN. I maintain that the existence of sluices for the reception 
of public opinion into the supranational governance structure – in this case, 
rendered by the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Community Blueprints – can be 
deemed highly substantive. In sum, ASEAN’s political structures are indeed 
very promising for the cultivation of the public opinion to be admitted into the 
public spheres at the ASEAN level.
Jebat  Volume 42 (2) (December 2015) Page | 10
Article: Abdul Muein Abadi
 
Finding 2: ASEAN Discursive Publics 
From the annual report as well as their critical articles and activities that 
widely circulated on web, the expansion of scope for advocacy works by CSOs 
at the ASEAN level can be observed. Two of the most valuable sources in 
that particular respect are the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International 
Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Solidarity of Asian People’s Advocacy 
(SAPA). Both civil society networks organize their own sort of “transnational 
deliberative forum” involving direct participation from the ASEAN’s demos. 
The ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) was organized by ASEAN-ISIS, 
meanwhile SAPA was responsible for the continuity of the ASEAN People’s 
Forum (APF). ASEAN-ISIS – consisted mostly of the academic and think-tank 
groups – set the first regional civil society moves to engage ASEAN leaders 
via the APA. This dialogue integrally serves as a “bridge” between civil society 
organizations in the Southeast Asia with the ASEAN senior officials. 
Apart from the norms of publicity qualities, the political impact of 
civil society‟s dialogue is another critical source of societal transformation 
that needs to be scrutinized from the transnational public sphere‟s perspective 
(Crack 2008, p.149).  This particular impact – collectively formulated will 
and opinion – upon the governing institutions, is summarized as “political 
efficacy”.  Indeed, even those civil society organizations that participate in the 
very first meeting of the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ASCS) already 
acknowledge the value of their collectively formulated will- and opinion in 
relation to the ASEAN‟s governance:  
“Civil society participants recognized the need for more openness 
and transparency at all levels of the ASEAN power structure in order 
to secure greater accountability and allow civil society to effectively 
play their roles as watchdogs, monitors and early warning systems. 
Towards this end, the deep feeling was that civil society was not 
getting access to accurate, relevant and timely information on matters 
of concern to the people” (Statement of the ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference to the 11th ASEAN Summit, 9 December 2005, p.2).  
 I continue to investigate the degree of ASEAN‟s civil society 
organizations‟ political efficacy from three perspectives: the ASEAN 
Charter drafting process, interface meeting with ASEAN Summit, and their 
involvement with ASEAN Community Councils.  
ASEAN Charter Drafting  
As a fundamental framework that serves as a legal foundation for ASEAN, 
input from ASEAN‟s demos as well as the actual outcomes of the engagement 
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in ASEAN Charter can be considered the perfect litmus test from the “political 
efficacy” point of view. Nevertheless, most of the submissions prepared by 
civil society organizations – represented by SAPA –obviously did not make it 
into the final document of the ASEAN Charter.  
On the other hand, in spite of the projected benefits offered by the 
APA, the majority of the dialogue participants were not happy with the APA’s 
“exclusiveness” and its continuous “uncritical stance” towards most of the 
ASEAN’s policies. APA’s severe lack of “norms of publicity” has resulted 
in the birth of the SAPA and APF. The SAPA has been very proactive from 
the beginning; not only that it stimulates the APF, but it also continuously 
empowers the grassroots to be able to engage ASEAN. Along with their 
perseverance in providing critical check and balances towards ASEAN – 
whether in the ASEAN Charter drafting process or various engagements with 
the ASEAN Community Councils – the valuable presence of the transnational 
network of civil society organizations in ASEAN definitely substantiates the 
ASEAN public spheres. 
 However, just by participating in a number of consultative meetings 
with ASEAN‟s representatives without a full capacity to decide on the final 
version of the Charter – as in the European Constitution referendum case – shall 
not make ASEAN‟s civil society organizations pass the “political efficacy” 
test with  excellence.  Furthermore, the distrust and frustration among some 
of the civil society organizations towards the whole ASEAN Charter drafting 
process are far from minimal:  
“The EPG says it has met civil society groups but many have not heard 
about the Charter…Critics suspect the lack of public consultation over 
the Charter could be due to the real intention behind the blueprint. 
They see the charter as giving a legal personality to ASEAN, paving 
the way for a regional economic framework that would facilitate 
investment and trade in the region, while the interests of ordinary 
people- workers, the poor and the marginalized- could come a distant 
second” (Anil Netto, cited from Jörn Dosch 2008, p.77-78).  
Despite the unfortunate degree of participation in the ASEAN Charter 
drafting the consultative process, civil society organizations in ASEAN 
nevertheless should be proud of themselves.  In terms of perseverance and 
resilience, they have proven that they are more than just a rubber stamp or 
plain observer.  We should never forget that they were facing an entity that 
was yet to be fully democratic – at least in terms of its openness to their 
people‟s participation – when it comes to gauging the ASEAN‟s civil society 
organizations political efficacy from the Charter drafting perspective.  It is 
appropriate for us now to move on to analyze their political efficacy in terms 
of their direct interface meeting with ASEAN leaders.  
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Interface Meeting with the ASEAN Summit  
The introduction of the “interface meeting” between the civil society 
organization‟s representatives with ASEAN leaders by the Malaysian 
government during the 2005 ASEAN Summit has paved the way for highly 
critical opinions and voices to be echoed at the ASEAN level.  For instance, 
these were among the crucial inputs that had been briefed in that particular 
ASEAN Summit: 
“Participants urge the ASEAN Summit to reconsider the „ASEAN 
way” of dealing with these trans-boundary challenges so that swift 
and effective action can be taken in the interest of the people. The 
principle of consensus should not hinder ASEAN from acting 
decisively on behalf of justice when the situation so demands” 
(Proposal Five, Statement of the ASEAN Civil Society Conference to 
the 11th ASEAN Summit, 9 December 2005, p.4).  
“Our population structure demands that women, youth and indigenous 
people are adequately represented at all levels of decision making 
processes within ASEAN.  Civil Society urges greater focus and 
attention to women, youth and indigenous peoples. Recognizing their 
rights and broadening their participation in society will go a long 
way in creating a safer, more stable and caring ASEAN community. 
ASEAN governments should also ensure that they have equitable 
access to healthcare services particularly in relation to reproductive 
health and HIV/AIDS” (Proposal Nine, Statement of the ASEAN 
Civil Society Conference to the 11th ASEAN Summit, 9 December 
2005, p.7).  
Such profound and critical proposals – directly presented to the 
ASEAN leaders – were nowhere to be found in the previous Track-II Dialogue 
(APA).  Regardless of the outcomes, such platform has been considered 
positively by civil society organizations:  
“The interface meeting is symbolic.  You cannot expect anything to 
come out from that.  But that is not the point.  The point is the gesture, 
the political gesture.  Because this is about institutionalization. 
Institutionalization  means we have to have this meeting as a formal 
agenda of the leaders.  So we have to do it every year, no matter 
whether the host country is ready or not.  As it is a tradition, we have 
to do it” (Yuyun Wahyuningrum interview by Quayle 2013, p.126). 
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Involvement in the ASEAN Community Councils  
Apart from the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Community Councils is another 
ASEAN‟s political machinery that has to be reckoned with.  In parallel with 
the Southeast Asian civil society organizations‟ vows during the 2nd ASEAN 
Civil Society Conference (ACSC) 2006:  
“We resolve to continue to engage with and challenge the ASEAN at all 
levels, making use of all available spaces and opportunities to defend 
and advance the rights and interests of the marginalized and excluded 
people in the region. We further resolve to strengthen our ranks and 
expand our initiative in solidarity and movement building, challenge 
ourselves to be more inclusive and participatory, and respond to issues 
of urgent concern in a timely manner. We commit to build an ASEAN 
People’s Charter that reflects the rights, interests and aspirations of all 
peoples in the ASEAN region…We demand that the ASEAN create 
effective mechanisms for transparency, accountability and people’s 
participation. In particular, we demand for automatic civil society 
seats in all decision making processes of the ASEAN” (Statement of 
the 2nd ASEAN Civil Society Conference, 12 December 2006).  
Comprised of three distinctive Councils – the ASEAN Political 
Security Council, ASEAN Economic Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Council – ASEAN Community Councils are much more administrative in 
nature and less political as compared to the ASEAN Summit.  Therefore, 
it is tacitly much easier for civil society organizations to engage ASEAN 
Community Councils as recognized by one of their representatives:  
“The sectorals…continue to engage, and I think, when the level is 
higher, then the conflict becomes higher.  When the level is lower, 
we can talk more [about] substance and engaging… So, we come 
here, because we have a common interest, a common goal, a common 
concern.  With the ASEAN leaders, we don‟t have a common and 
straight-to-the-point goal…But when it comes to issue-based 
[meetings], we share the language.  Then the communication happens, 
because we share the concern” (Quayle 2013, p.138, interview with 
Yuyun Wahyuningrum).  
 Nevertheless, these relationships are still relatively problematic, 
especially when it comes to the ASEAN Economic Council.  Leftist 
organizations, for instance, was hesitant to engage ASEAN in this particular 
area due to its projection as a “neoliberal organization” that opposes the ideas 
of social justice:  
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“For this reason, I think a lot of the advocacy issues around the 
trade and investment agenda have not really been pushed for in an 
appropriate manner… it‟s a pity, because you cannot change ASEAN 
unless you actually try to sit down and talk to them (Quayle 2013, 
p.128, interview with Chandra).   
 Evidently, these networks have succeeded in stimulating counter-
hegemonic discourses across the region. The phenomenon of the transnational 
civil society organizations‟ engagement in the regionalization process 
in the Southeast Asia implies that ASEAN is gradually transformed by the 
“regionalism from below” forces. In one way or another, the critical mass 
supports are obviously valuable resources as it was the case with the SAPA-
led APF. However, only by relying on the existence of such resources alone 
– as Social Constructivist and English School theorists tend to do – shall 
conceal scholarly research from the potential of one critical force that must 
be reckoned with when it comes to the emancipation subjects: public opinion. 
To add, there is no other medium that is more appropriate to be approached 
in order to investigate ASEAN‟s demos‟ public opinion than the media and 
communication infrastructure. Let us then turn to investigate the critical public 
opinion underpinnings of the ASEAN public spheres in the next finding.
Finding 3: ASEAN Trans-border Communicative Infrastructure 
I have focused on the potential of the new media in the contemporary 
Southeast Asia: the Internet. Due to a rather plural history engulfing each of 
the ten ASEAN countries, I provide a macro-overview pertaining to not only 
the trans-border media infrastructure in the region, but also the circulations 
of the ASEAN’s civil society organizations’ formulated opinions into each of 
those countries. This encompassing overview is deemed more than essential 
since the central concerns of the public sphere precepts are highly related to the 
circulations of the “critical publicity”, rather than the “manipulative” publicity. 
Thus, instead of narrowing my focus only on the officially reported news 
regarding ASEAN affairs, it is more normatively crucial for me to highlight 
the civil society organizations-formed opinions on ASEAN. In this case, a 
high degree of critical debates reported in the media that stems from the APF 
indicate a high degree of “critical publicity” in the Southeast Asian’s media 
infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, some identified impediments such as the asymmetric 
patterns of the media ownership and the state censorship in some ASEAN 
countries had restricted this critical publicity from being unleashed to the fullest. 
The combination of those impediments has exacerbated ASEAN’s demos’ 
access to information, especially to those critical opinions formulated by the 
civil society organizations upon regional affairs. This condition deteriorated 
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their opportunities for trans-boundary deliberative political mobilization. On 
the other hand, this study finds that the relationship between business profit 
interests and the circulation of critical publicity among ASEAN’s demos on 
ASEAN affairs are rather symbiotic in manner. It is not so much confined in 
the “colonization” nature as depicted by Habermas.  
In the Southeast Asia case, business news has almost always taken 
a main portion of news that allocated to make coverage of ASEAN.  Not 
only in The Star (Malaysia) and The Straits Times (Singapore), even in the 
Vietnam News (Vietnam) and the Vientiane Times (Laos) the reports on 
ASEAN‟s market integration, local business readiness, and the country‟s 
market resilience to compete in the upcoming ASEAN Economic Community 
progress have been published consistently.  Even the ratio of their coverage on 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project compared to the coverage on 
the ASEAN SocioCultural Community (ASCC) project is almost incalculable. 
Nevertheless, the existence of “forum” or space for “public opinion formation 
and debates” – particularly in The Star (Malaysia) – has proven to be crucial. 
A recent collaboration project between the CIMB Group (Malaysia), Star 
Publications (M) Bhd (Malaysia), The Jakarta Post (Indonesia), The Nation 
(Thailand), and The Philippine Daily Inquirer (Philippines) has been forged 
in, where a so-called “CIMB-ASEAN e-paper” has been launched in the effort 
to reach out to 450 million of ASEAN‟s 600 million population. The Jakarta 
Post (Indonesia), The Nation (Thailand), and The Philippine Daily Inquirer 
(Philippines) are highly productive in publishing a vast array of critical views 
and opinions on ASEAN.  Under this business-oriented networking project, the 
proliferation and circulation of critical publicity across four ASEAN countries 
involved marked a unique symbiotic relationship between the business profit 
and critical media that shall benefit the media‟s prerequisite for the emergence 
of ASEAN public spheres. 
Quite in an opposite manner as compared to Habermas’ suspicion 
with regard to the “colonization” of business and market interests upon 
the criticalness of media, the Southeast Asian context gave us somewhat 
a “symbiotic” picture of the relationship between them. Built upon the 
collaboration between the CIMB Group (Malaysia), Star Publications (M) 
Bhd (Malaysia), The Jakarta Post (Indonesia), The Nation (Thailand) and The 
Philippine Daily Inquirer (Philippines), a so-called “CIMB-ASEAN e-paper” 
has been launched. With numerous critical articles on ASEAN that have 
always been centered in each of those four national newspapers, the expanding 
effort that is originally stimulated by business profits interest is simultaneously 
expanding the proliferation of the critical opinion on ASEAN across the four 
countries. It can be anticipated that the media infrastructure in ASEAN are 
currently progressing rapidly towards more people-centered notions and thus, 
has provided a conducive milieu for the emergence of the ASEAN public 
sphere. 
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Discussion & Conclusion
This inquiry is anchored on the Habermas’ public sphere theory that originally 
recounts the rise and dissolution of the eighteenth century bourgeois society 
in Europe. I employed his public sphere’s structural prerequisites in order to 
assess the prospects of the present Southeast Asian citizens – or ASEAN’s 
demos – to substantively involve in the ASEAN Community building project. 
Despite of the “people-centered” notions that can be found everywhere in 
ASEAN Community documents, the actual progress does not seem to support 
the slogans. There is nothing more apparent to prove this reality as compared 
to the series of exclusive back-door negotiations by the ultimate political 
authority in ASEAN – the ASEAN Summit – that monopolizes the crucial 
regional decision-making authority. This elitist “ASEAN Way” was also 
moving hand in hand with the privilege enjoyed by the large corporations with 
regard to the massive developmental project – both at the expense of ASEAN’s 
demos’ voices. Nevertheless, I did not opt for the pessimistic stance that has 
been taken by most of the contemporary Southeast Asian scholars when 
discussing democratization prospects in ASEAN. I continue to investigate 
the potential patterns that might converge and lead to the emergence of the 
ASEAN public spheres. For this purpose, I specifically modified the definition 
of the ASEAN public sphere: “a transnational site of deliberation in which civil 
society organizations reach understandings about issues of common concern 
in ASEAN according to the norms of publicity”. I reconstruct the structural 
requirements for the emergence of the public sphere to be implemented in 
the context of the contemporary ASEAN’s settings. Three outlined structural 
preconditions for the emergence of the ASEAN public spheres were: 
accountable and receptive governance authority; inclusive, deliberative, and 
critical activist networks; as well as free and open media infrastructure. Each 
of those underlined normative prerequisites has been critically compared 
against the eventual realities dwelling in Southeast Asia.
Throughout this paper, I contest that the central position acquired 
by the media apparatus under this particular theory is integral. On the other 
hand, by employing this reconfigured theoretical design, I had identified the 
way democracy can be enhanced at the ASEAN level in parallel with the 
ASEAN Community trajectory. Far from being a pro-status quo or state-
centric as in the case of the Realist theory, the modified ASEAN public sphere 
perspective questioning the monopoly of decision-making capacity in the 
hands of ten ASEAN Summit’s leaders. By acknowledging the nation states’ 
prowess in ASEAN, this theory escaped the utopia promoted by the Pluralist’s 
view – accommodating, rather than rejecting the authority possessed by the 
ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Community Councils, and ASEAN Secretariat. By 
emphasizing the multifaceted challenges faced by the ASEAN’s demos, this 
modified theory had also overcoming the weakness of Neo-Marxism theory: 
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limited material disparities-focused. This theory also strongly subjected the 
notion of “ASEAN Way” into the scrutiny – as opposed to the “uncritical” 
stance of the “appreciative” Social Constructivism theory. By positing the 
importance of the existence of a critical, free, and widespread media, the 
application of ASEAN public sphere conceptualizations had been able to 
despise the exclusivity of the civil society activism at the expense of wider 
ASEAN’s publics or demos – as opposed to the English School’s approach 
(Quayle 2012; 2013). As compared to the Neo-Communitarian theory that 
relies almost entirely on the “ideal” consensus formation among diverse civil 
society organizations in the international arena (Azizudin Sani & Abu Bakar 
2013), the ASEAN public spheres’ perspective are more reasonable. Not only it 
posits the possibility of the incoherency among the civil society organizations 
via transnational deliberative forum, but also proposed a remedy: the variants 
of “critical publicity” carried by transnational media infrastructure. 
On the other hand, it is beyond dispute that the role of trans-border 
communicative infrastructure vis-à-vis transnational political authority and 
transnational civil society organizations network has been staged primarily 
by the Habermas-inspired transnational public sphere theory. In that regard, 
the capacity of critical publicity to be dispersed across the region against 
traditional impediments – whether spatial or temporal – has been reconciled 
to a certain degree. Most notably, by the rise of ICT that goes hand in hand 
with the globalization. Hence, the application of transnational public sphere 
normative preconditions – reconstructed into the search for the ASEAN public 
sphere in this inquiry – shall contribute significantly from the international 
organizations’ democratization’s point of view. By incorporating the forms of 
political participation among ASEAN’s demos via the ICT, a wider debate that 
accelerated ASEAN’s demos’ efficacy was not being excluded.
End Notes
1. South East Asian Committee for Advocacy website (SEACA.net); 
 Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group; 
 Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) 
 website; Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources 
 in Rural Asia (AsiaDHRRA) website; Third World Network (TWN) 
 website; Focus on the Global South (FOCUS) website; The Irrawaddy.
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